Chapters

Introduction
Kansas-Nebraska Act
Seeds of Discontent
The 12th Confederate State
Missouri’s Provisional Union Government
Post War Politics

Missouri’s Provisional Union Government owed much of its existence to the military leadership of Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon. The Camp Jackson Massacre put Missouri on the road to war. The last chance for peace came when Lyon met Governor Claiborne Jackson and Sterling Price, commander of the new Missouri State Guard at the Planters House in St. Louis. There was little chance the meeting on June 11 could have prevented further bloodshed. The Missourians were stalling so they could prepare for battle and Lyon was uncompromising. As he left, Lyon told them, “Rather than concede to the State of Missouri for one single instant the right to dictate to my government in any matter however important, I would see you, and you, and you, and you, and every man, woman and child in the State, dead and buried! This means war!”1

Lyon moved quickly following the Planters House Conference because he worried the Missouri troops would unite with Confederates in northwest Arkansas. To prevent this, he coordinated three separate forces which were to converge on Springfield. The Missouri State Guard would be crushed in the giant pincer movement. On June 15, Lyon led one of his columns into Jefferson City, only to find the state government had fled. Jackson tried to make a stand at Boonville, but the fledgling Missouri State Guard was routed in a small skirmish with Lyon’s command. Meanwhile, as Lyon feared, Sterling Price left for southern Missouri where he hoped to gain the assistance of Confederate General Benjamin McCulloch in Arkansas.2

Without a government, Missouri turned to its most recently elected body, the secession convention which had met in March. The critical issue facing the convention when it gathered in St. Louis was its own powers and constitutionality. Some delegates argued the convention could not legally depose the state government; such a measure required the vote of the people. These arguments did not sway the convention and they replaced Missouri’s legally elected officials with a provisional government. For the most prominent face of their creation the convention elected Hamilton R. Gamble governor. A well known moderate, Gamble was clearly the best choice for such a delicate position.3

The military situation in Missouri, specifically the guerrilla conflict, occupied much of Governor Gamble’s time. His handling of military affairs prompted intense criticism, ironically, from both sides. A conventional military campaign set the stage for guerrilla warfare in Missouri. The decisive Union victory at Pea Ridge in March 1862, led Confederate commanders to shift most of their troops east of the Mississippi River. Union commanders did likewise. While these strategic decisions were understandable, they regrettably made Missouri a backwater for both sides.4

Since fewer federal volunteers remained in Missouri, battling guerrillas became a job for local units. In the spring of 1861, home guard companies performed this duty. The chance for local service made these units very popular among recruits. After 1861, the demand for men in three year volunteer regiments increased. Many of these Missouri units were already fighting east of the Mississippi River. Because of this, it became harder to find men willing to serve far from home, especially if a home guard company was available. This, combined with a reputation for being ineffective, led to the home guard units being merged with the three year regiments.5

Shortly after taking office, Governor Gamble realized a state militia was necessary to adequately protect Missouri. On August 17, 1861, he issued a proclamation establishing the Missouri State Militia. Gamble hoped that 42,000 volunteers would enlist for six months in the new militia. Just over 6,000 Missourians answered his call. This reluctance was not necessarily a rejection of military service. Gamble’s administration was responsible for paying and equipping the troops. Since the provisional government had no way to raise money, many recruits saw the federal regiments as a more stable option. Gamble argued the federal government should assume this burden and he lobbied officials in Washington for support. Unfortunately for Gamble, the Lincoln administration had numerous responsibilities and priorities. Though Lincoln acknowledged the need, the federal government provided little support to the Missouri Militia. Though his lobbying brought few monetary rewards on this issue, Gamble established a direct line of communication with President Lincoln. Together, they worked to establish peace and security in Missouri throughout the war.6

The Missouri State Militia became an increasingly effective counter-guerrilla force, but additional men were still needed. Brigadier General John Schofield assumed command of most Union troops operating in Missouri in the spring of 1862. Faced with more guerrilla activity during this period, Schofield and Gamble returned to the home guard concept for local defense. In one of his most controversial acts of the war, Gamble issued General Order Number 19 on July 22, 1862, which created the Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM).7 All able-bodied men in the state were ordered to report for duty in the EMM. Although it was compulsory service, it was not active duty. The Enrolled Missouri Militia would only be called out when guerrilla activity threatened a specific area. Local EMM soldiers would respond, and once the crisis had passed, they would return to their normal civilian occupations.8

General Schofield developed a unique way to solve the funding issue. Confederate sympathizers, rather than the state or federal government would supply the EMM. Accordingly, an assessment of $5,000 was placed on the disloyal residents of Jefferson City on September 29, 1862. Of this money, $3,000 was directed to finance EMM campaigns, the remaining $2,000 supplied the families of Union soldiers.9 Once recruits for the EMM gathered at a designated assembly area, Union authorities determined their loyalty. This became an intensely partisan and personal affair. Unionists could identify their neighbors as disloyal on grounds of personal animosity rather than political allegiance. Many men lost their property through this process.10 Although Gamble initially endorsed the plan, the assessment process was infamous for fraud and abuse. These abuses turned Governor Gamble against the process, and though President Lincoln ultimately outlawed it, the assessments alienated many Missourians.11

Much like Lyon’s actions at Camp Jackson, Gamble’s Enrolled Missouri Militia created many Rebels. At best, most of these new Confederates had been neutral. The men most committed to a cause had long since made their choice. Still, many able-bodied men throughout Missouri joined irregular companies and the Confederate army in response to Gamble’s order. Some men worried this was the first step to compulsory service in an active regiment. Others rejected yet another example of aggressive Union tactics. Whatever their reason, many of the new recruits served the Southern cause well for the remainder of the war. General Order Number 19 was the final sign that war had come to Missouri and all Missouri men were forced to choose a side.12

The service record of the Enrolled Missouri Militia was mixed, from “laughable to laudable,” as one historian wrote.13 The quality of training and leadership varied widely throughout the companies. Thus, they were always a question mark for commanders, and the frequent depredations of some companies alienated the civilian population. Enrolled Missouri Militia units often performed routine military duty such as garrisoning isolated posts and guarding resources. With these assignments, EMM companies allowed more reliable units to actively campaign against guerrillas. By the end of the war, over 52,000 men were mustered into 70 regiments of the EMM. While plagued with a stereotype created by its notorious elements, many Enrolled Missouri Militia regiments “became professional in their demeanor and execution, defended their home areas with distinction, even won acclaim for occasional combat, and often performed these feats with their own private weapons, clothing, and horses.”14

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1. William Garrett Piston and Richard W. Hatcher III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 42.
2. Piston and Hatcher, Wilson’s Creek, 44-47, 81.
3. Dennis K. Boman, Lincoln’s Resolute Unionist: Hamilton Gamble, Dred Scott Dissenter and Missouri’s Civil War Governor (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006), 111-12.
4. Bruce Nichols, Guerrilla Warfare in Civil War Missouri, 1862 (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2004), 103.
5. Boman, Lincoln’s Resolute Unionist, 118-19, 174-75; Nichols, Guerrilla Warfare 1862, 103.
6. Boman, Lincoln’s Resolute Unionist, 121-22.
7. U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, Volume 13, 506, herafter cited as O.R.
8. Nichols, Guerrilla Warfare 1862, 103-04; Boman, Lincoln’s Resolute Unionist, 175-76.
9. O.R. Series I, Volume 13, 691.
10. Nichols, Guerrilla Warfare 1862, 104.
11. Boman, Lincoln’s Resolute Unionist, 193-95.
12. Nichols, Guerrilla Warfare 1862, 104-05.
13. Nichols, Guerrilla Warfare 1862, 104.
14. Nichols, Guerrilla Warfare 1862, 104.